Electricity on Shabbat
Whether or not the prohibition of creating a fire on Shabbat applies to the use of electrical devices is a matter of opinion. The Halacha on the matter is not settled, and anyone who tells you otherwise is mistaken. Now depending on your particular flavor of Judaism, that may seem an extraordinary claim, and extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. But before we get directly into the discussion of electricity and whether or not it is indeed a form of fire, let us take a contextually relevant detour to the laws of Judges.
<detour>
Devarim/Deuteronomy 17:8-11 says:
כִּ֣י יִפָּלֵא֩ מִמְּךָ֨ דָבָ֜ר לַמִּשְׁפָּ֗ט בֵּֽין־דָּ֨ם ׀ לְדָ֜ם בֵּֽין־דִּ֣ין לְדִ֗ין וּבֵ֥ין נֶ֙גַע֙ לָנֶ֔גַע דִּבְרֵ֥י רִיבֹ֖ת בִּשְׁעָרֶ֑יךָ וְקַמְתָּ֣ וְעָלִ֔יתָ אֶ֨ל־הַמָּק֔וֹם אֲשֶׁ֥ר יִבְחַ֛ר יְהֹוָ֥ה אֱלֹהֶ֖יךָ בּֽוֹ׃
If a matter of law is beyond your understanding, (for example) between [impure] blood to [pure] blood, between [an innocent] verdict and [a guilty] verdict, between [contaminated] leprosy and [uncontaminated] leprosy, [in essence] matters under dispute in your city, you should rise up and ascend to the place that Hashem, your G-d has chosen for you.
וּבָאתָ֗ אֶל־הַכֹּהֲנִים֙ הַלְוִיִּ֔ם וְאֶ֨ל־הַשֹּׁפֵ֔ט אֲשֶׁ֥ר יִהְיֶ֖ה בַּיָּמִ֣ים הָהֵ֑ם וְדָרַשְׁתָּ֙ וְהִגִּ֣ידוּ לְךָ֔ אֵ֖ת דְּבַ֥ר הַמִּשְׁפָּֽט׃
And you should come to the Kohanim, to the Leviim, and to the [head] judge that will be in your days and you should inquire [about the matter], and they will tell you the ruling.
וְעָשִׂ֗יתָ עַל־פִּ֤י הַדָּבָר֙ אֲשֶׁ֣ר יַגִּ֣ידֽוּ לְךָ֔ מִן־הַמָּק֣וֹם הַה֔וּא אֲשֶׁ֖ר יִבְחַ֣ר יְהֹוָ֑ה וְשָׁמַרְתָּ֣ לַעֲשׂ֔וֹת כְּכֹ֖ל אֲשֶׁ֥ר יוֹרֽוּךָ׃
You shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that יהוה chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you.
עַל־פִּ֨י הַתּוֹרָ֜ה אֲשֶׁ֣ר יוֹר֗וּךָ וְעַל־הַמִּשְׁפָּ֛ט אֲשֶׁר־יֹאמְר֥וּ לְךָ֖ תַּעֲשֶׂ֑ה לֹ֣א תָס֗וּר מִן־הַדָּבָ֛ר אֲשֶׁר־יַגִּ֥ידֽוּ לְךָ֖ יָמִ֥ין וּשְׂמֹֽאל׃
You shall act in accordance with the instructions given to you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left.
The Mishna clarifies the passages above to show that only the highest court, the Great Sanhedrin, has the authority to issue a binding legal/halachic determination on new matters.
Mishna Sanhedrin 11:2:
זָקֵן מַמְרֵא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שם יז) כִּי יִפָּלֵא מִמְּךָ דָבָר לַמִּשְׁפָּט וְגוֹ'. שְׁלֹשָׁה בָתֵּי דִינִין הָיוּ שָׁם, אֶחָד יוֹשֵׁב עַל פֶּתַח הַר הַבַּיִת, וְאֶחָד יוֹשֵׁב עַל פֶּתַח הָעֲזָרָה, וְאֶחָד יוֹשֵׁב בְּלִשְׁכַּת הַגָּזִית. בָּאִים לָזֶה שֶׁעַל פֶּתַח הַר הַבַּיִת, וְאוֹמֵר, כָּךְ דָּרַשְׁתִּי וְכָךְ דָּרְשׁוּ חֲבֵרָי, כָּךְ לִמַּדְתִּי וְכָךְ לִמְּדוּ חֲבֵרָי. אִם שָׁמְעוּ, אוֹמְרִים לָהֶם. וְאִם לָאו, בָּאִין לָהֶם לְאוֹתָן שֶׁעַל פֶּתַח הָעֲזָרָה, וְאוֹמֵר, כָּךְ דָּרַשְׁתִּי וְכָךְ דָּרְשׁוּ חֲבֵרָי, כָּךְ לִמַּדְתִּי וְכָךְ לִמְּדוּ חֲבֵרָי. אִם שָׁמְעוּ, אוֹמְרִים לָהֶם. וְאִם לָאו, אֵלּוּ וָאֵלּוּ בָּאִים לְבֵית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁבְּלִשְׁכַּת הַגָּזִית, שֶׁמִּמֶּנּוּ יוֹצֵאת תּוֹרָה לְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שם) מִן הַמָּקוֹם הַהוּא אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר ה'. חָזַר לְעִירוֹ וְשָׁנָה וְלִמֵּד כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁהָיָה לָמֵד, פָּטוּר. וְאִם הוֹרָה לַעֲשׂוֹת, חַיָּב, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שם) וְהָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יַעֲשֶׂה בְזָדוֹן, אֵינוֹ חַיָּב עַד שֶׁיּוֹרֶה לַעֲשׂוֹת. תַּלְמִיד שֶׁהוֹרָה לַעֲשׂוֹת, פָּטוּר, נִמְצָא חֻמְרוֹ קֻלּוֹ:
“A rebellious elder against the Court’s decision, for it is written, “If there shall arise a matter too hard for you in judgement…” (Deut 17:8) Three Courts were there: one sits at the entrance to the Temple Mount, and one sits at the entrance to the Temple Court, and one sits in the Gazit Chamber. They come to this one which is at the entrance to the Temple Mount, and he says, “Thus I expounded and thus my fellows expounded, thus I taught and thus my fellows taught.” If they had heard, they tell them; and if not they come to those at the entrance to the Temple Court, and he says “Thus I expounded and thus my fellows expounded, thus I taught and thus my fellows taught.” If they had heard, they tell them; and if not, these and these come to the Great Court which is in the Gazit Chamber, from which the Torah goes forth to all Israel, for it is written, “from that place which the Lord shall choose” (Deut 17:10). If he returned to his city, and again taught in the previous manner - he is exempt, and if he ruled to do - he is liable, for it is written, “And the man that does presumptuously” (Deut 17:12), he is not liable until he rules what is to be done. If a pupil ruled to do - he is exempt; it follows that his severity is his leniency”
This Mishna is giving us the clarity to understand who is considered a rebellious elder against the Court’s rulings. In other words, who is a Sage who was given the authorization to deliver legal rulings, but does not heed the Great Court, and rules in a manner that is contrary to their teachings, and is therefore liable to be strangled. All of this is an expansion of the previous Mishna (Sanhedrin 11:1) where we are told that such a person is liable to be strangled.
So how does this Mishna tell us to determine who is a “rebellious elder against the Court’s rulings”? Well such a person would come to the court which sits at the entrance of the Temple Mount, the lowest level of the 3 courts. And he would say to the court “So-and-so is what I am claiming, and such-and-such is what the other guys is claiming, and so-and-so is the ruling that I would give, and such-and-such is the rule that they would give” The lower court would listen to this man’s arguments, and listen to the counter-arguments, and if they have previously heard of this kind of disagreement and have been taught what is the proper way in which the argument is to be resolved, then they will tell that person who comes to them how to rule in the matter. If however they have not ever heard of such an argument before, they will direct the person before them to take their matter to the next court above; the 2nd level of courts, the one which sits at the Temple Court. Then the process repeats, the person before the court explains the argument and the cases for it and against it, and if the 2nd court has heard this dispute before and has learned how it is to be resolved, they teach the matter to the person before them. If they have not learned how to resolve this dispute then they similarly direct the person before them to the court above, the Great Court, the one which sits in the Gazit Chamber, the very one which is described in Deuteronomy 17:10 as “that place from which the Lord shall choose”. The person who makes it all the way to the Great Court must obey the instructions and teachings that they receive from it, for in that same verse (Deut 17:10) we are told “You should carefully obey everything they instruct you.”
This last part of the Mishna is a bit difficult to parse because it does not seem to explicitly say if the person before the Great Court had his previously held opinions on the matter confirmed by the court or denied by the court, but based on context it seem to be discussing the case in which the Great Court tells him that he is incorrect in some manner. Why is that my understanding? Because if he was correct and validated by the Great Court, it would seem like a moot point whether or not he is liable to be strangled; after all, he got the ruling right. Whereas in the case where he previously taught or ruled incorrectly (and we will soon discuss the difference between teaching and ruling, it makes a big difference!) now we are in the realm of asking the question if the man is liable to be strangled. But just to be absolutely clear, that previous point is my understanding, my opinion, my interpretation of the Mishna, and I hope to be very clear that I am not claiming that the Mishna itself says that it is discussing the case in which the man before the Great Court is corrected or somehow disproven by the Great Court, rather that I believe that is what is it discussing, based on my own logical reasoning and analysis of context clues. Nevertheless, let us go on.
In my understanding, the Mishna essentially says that if the man returns to his city and teaches again in the previous manner, he is not liable to be strangled. However if he returns to his city and rules again in the previous manner, he is liable to be strangled. In other words, if the man goes to the Great Court and is corrected or disproven, and then goes back home to repeat his previously held opinion despite the fact that the Great Court told him that he was wrong, that only makes him liable for strangulation if he repeats his incorrect notion as a ruling for a case before him, and not if he repeats his incorrect notion as a teaching for educational purposes. Perhaps this is an opportune time to state for the record that this essay is for educational purposes only.
Let us for a moment consider the possibility that I have misinterpreted the Mishnah, and in reality the Mishnah is claiming that if a man comes before the Great Court, and makes his argument clear and the counter-argument clear, and the Great Court affirms the validity and correctness of his previously held beliefs, and the man then goes back to his home town and rules in the manner he did previously, he is liable to be strangled. In other words, even if the Great Court validates him, he must somehow rule differently than he did before by simple virtue of the fact that he had to bring his question before the Great Court. I find this interpretation to be less plausible, although plausible nonetheless. Thankfully, either way, the point which is most relevant to this essay does not depend on the resolution of this question. The relevant point, which we now understand from the primary source, is that the Great Court is the only entity empowered to rule on novel cases.
Footnote: There is even the possibility that if an independent elder comes to the same understanding that the Great Court would have come to, but he was not taught the understanding from the Great Court themselves, and he does not somehow adjust or find tune his teachings as a result of confirming his understanding with the Great Court directly, he is still liable to be strangled. In other words, it is possible (although in my estimation, not the case) that the Great Court is not only the ultimate benchmark which new rulings must be measured against in order to determine their legitimacy, but the Great Court must have some influence on rulings on novel cases, even in the case where the rulings determined before consulting with the Great Court are practically the same ruling that they Great Court would have given themselves.
</detour>
Now let us return to the question about using electrical devices on Shabbat.
Shemot/Exodus 35:3 says:
“You should not kindle fire in any of your dwelling places on the Shabbat day.”
The problem, as I see it, is how we have interpreted electricity to qualify as fire. Human study and use of electricity didn’t really begin until more than a thousand years after the Great Court (The Great Sanhedrin) was destroyed, and as we have learned before, the Great Sanhedrin was the only entity given the authority to rule in novel cases. Certainly the discovery of electricity and its application in daily life should qualify as a novel development. So that leaves us in a vacuum of understanding, a place where the Torah seems to not clearly tell us whether or not electricity is considered to be a fire. In my personal life, I am surrounded by those who claim that electricity is indeed a fire, but I do not find that to be a convincing claim. Those who make such claims often refer to a “spark” as a kind of fire, and claim that all electrical devices create sparks; I will argue against the truth of both of those claims:
Firstly, let us define and describe “fire”. Fire is the process by which fuel (for example wood, coal, or gasoline) reacts with an oxidizer (usually oxygen, although other oxidizing substances such as chlorine, bromine, and fluorine may also be used as oxidizers) in a process known as combustion, a kind of exothermic oxidation. This combustion reaction results in the loss of electrons from the molecular structure of the fuel, which is what classifies it as oxidation. It also releases thermal energy, which is what classifies it as exothermic. This combustion reaction can only take place in an environment of sufficiently high energy. (Or in other words, things need to be hot in order to burn) Given that combustion itself releases thermal energy which was previously stored as chemical potential energy in the bonds of the fuel and oxidizer (or in other words burning makes things hot), it can be a self-sustaining chain reaction so long as there is both fuel and oxidizer present. This is oftentimes simplified by saying that fire is the reaction that takes place when fuel, oxygen, and heat are all present in the same place and at the same time.
Ok, so then what is a spark? A spark is the process by which a sufficiently large amount of electrical energy, seen as voltage potential across some material which is generally a poor conductor of electricity, (most commonly air) overcomes the resistance of that material. In other words, the material which usually acts like an electrical insulator, for a moment, becomes an electrical conductor. This process results in the ionization of the material which conducts the spark, meaning the electrons in the material are liberated from the nuclei which they are normally surrounding. In a spark, some molecules in the air will gain electrons, some will lose electrons. Like a fire, a spark releases thermal energy, which means that a spark in the presence of fuel and oxidizer can be used to start a fire.
But unlike a fire:
A spark does not require fuel
A spark does not require an oxidizer
A spark does not require an environment of high thermal energy in order to begin
A spark is not a self-sustaining chemical chain reaction
The thermal energy released by a spark comes from the electrical energy, not chemical potential energy
All of this is to say that a fire and a spark are quite different things. What they mostly have in common is that they are hot and ethereal. Now suppose that you are not convinced, and you still maintain that a spark is a fire. Surely your belief in sabbatical prohibition of using electrical devices due to the prohibition of kindling a fire remains on solid grounds, right? Well, not really. Not all modern electronic devices even create sparks in the first place.
In normal operation, a smartphone is designed especially to not create any sparks. As we have discussed before, a spark can start a fire, and smartphone manufacturers try very hard to make sure their products are not “exhibit A” in a lawsuit claiming that their products are responsible for burning down your house. The lithium ion batteries in a modern smartphone can burn with quite a fervor if exposed to sufficiently high temperatures, the kind of temperatures generated by a spark. This is why smartphones are designed to operate at low voltages, (typically less than 5 volts internally and maybe up to 9 or so volts when fast-charging) why the path of electrical flow inside of smartphones are controlled and grounded, and components are different voltage potentials are placed in contact with one another or insulated by highly efficient insulators, removing the air gaps needed to facilitate a spark. If a smartphone’s battery is punctured or damaged, or if water gets into the device causing a short-circuit failure, a spark can certainly occur, but the designers of these products go through great lengths to ensure that this is not a common happening with their devices. When functioning normally, a smartphone does not create “sparks”. That’s not to say that other electrical devices don't create sparks either, flipping standard household light switches or plugging/unplugging items from standard household outlets oftentimes does create a real spark as electricity arcs through a very small air gap which exists for a brief moment as the switch is flipped or the device is plugged in or unplugged, but not all electrical devices cause sparks to form during the course of their normal operation.
So where does that leave us? Not all electrical devices cause sparks, and sparks are not the same thing as fire, and the judicial means by which novel legal questions like “Does the prohibition to create fire on Shabbat also apply to sparks?” Stopped functioning over a thousand years before we humans developed electrical technology in the first place. To say that it is a settled matter that we can’t use smartphones on Shabbat because of the prohibition to create fire, is in my humble opinion an overextension of Halacha. There might be some other good reason why smartphone use is prohibited on Shabbat, but if somebody points to Shemot 35:3 to justify the prohibition, I don't find that to be a very convincing explanation.
